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The Apportionment of Stock Distributions
In Trust Accounting Practice
ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR.*

This inquiry deals with the question, "What is income?"
question inherent in the terms "life estates" and "future interests." It is a question which will be raised in
one form or another so long as transfers are made for the
immediate benefit of one person and the ultimate benefit of
another.
The purpose of this study is to analyze how the courts,
and particularly the courts of Maryland, have answered
this question in respect of corporate distributions received
on securities held by trust estates. This study will be
divided into six subsections to be considered in the following order:
I - Definition of Terms
II
The Law as to Pre-1929 Trusts
III - The Law as to Trusts Created between 1929 and
1939
IV - The Law as to Post-1939 Trusts Governed by the
Uniform Principal and Income Act'
V - The Donaldson and Apponyi Cases
VI- The Problem Restated
-a

I - DEFINiTioN OF TERmS
For present purposes, the following definitions are
adopted:
(1) A "dividend" is a distribution of corporate assets
by a corporation to its stockholders. Its essential characteristic is a severance of corporate property, followed by
a distribution of that property to the stockholders of the
corporation.
(2) A "cash dividend" is a dividend paid in cash.
* A.B. 1942, Princeton University, LL.B. 1948, Harvard Law School;
Member, Baltimore City Bar.
17 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75B.
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(3) An "ordinary cash dividend" is a cash dividend
paid at regular intervals, representing a periodic division
of corporate profits.
(4) An "extraordinary cash dividend" is a cash dividend paid at irregular intervals, and is usually motivated
by some object other than the division of corporate profits.
(5) A "stock dividend" is a distribution by a corporation of its stock pro rata to its stockholders, intended as a
substitute for or an increment to an ordinary cash dividend. It is usually a small distribution in relation to the
stock previously outstanding - generally not over 25% and it has no appreciable effect on the market value of the
stock in public trading. The term is a misnomer in its
use of the word "dividend" since no "severance" of corporate assets is involved, and the proportional interest of each
stockholder in the capital and surplus of the company will
be the same after the distribution as it was before.' Accumulated earnings are transferred from surplus to capital
stock account but are not, as in the case of a cash dividend,
distributed to the stockholders. To be sure, a stockholder
receives something of value which he can convert into
cash if he wants to, and to this extent the distribution may
seem superficially to resemble a cash dividend. It should be
remembered, however, that if a stockholder spends his
cash dividends, his equity interest in the corporation remains unchanged. But if he sells a stock dividend and
spends the proceeds, he reduces his proportional interest in
the corporation.
(6) A "true stock split" is a distribution by a corporation to its stockholders of stock of a different par or stated
value in exchange for the stock previously outstanding,
resulting in a larger number of shares at a correspondingly
lower par or stated value but with no change in the comRule of the New York Stock Exchange entitled, "Statement on Stock
Dividends" dated July 21, 1955. This Rule establishes that stock distributions representing less than 25% of the shares previously 'outstanding
are stock dividends and must be capitalized by a charge to earned surplus
equal to the current fair value, i. e. the current market value adjusted
for the effect Of the distribution itself. A distribution representing 100%
or more of the stock previously outstanding is a "split", and only the
par value need be capitalized. See also: Accounting Research Bulletin
No. 11 issued on November 15, 1952, by the Committee on Accounting
Procedure of the American Institute of Accountants, advocating substantially the same rules.
I Some courts have so held. See, for example, Stipe v. First National
Bank, 208 Or. 551, 301 P. 2d 175, 186 (1956) holding that a stock dividend
is not a "dividend" at all. but is "nothing more than in incident or
process in corporate bookkeeping." And see: PATON, ADvAwCED AcCouNTING,
(1947) 587, commenting on "the questionable use of the term 'dividend'
in describing the phenomenon."
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pany's total capital outstanding.4 Since both the corporation and the stockholders thus remain in exactly the same
equity position after the split as they were before, its
principal results are the reduction of the market price
of the stock and the stimulation of its marketability.
These results are not usually accomplished by the stock
dividend. 5
(7) A "modern stock split" (admittedly a term coined
for purposes of this discussion) is a distribution by a corporation to its stockholders of a sufficient number of new
shares of stock, usually at least equivalent to 100% of the
stock previously outstanding, to reduce the market value
of the stock to levels attractive to the average investor of
100-share lots, thereby broadening the base of stockholder
ownership.6 The manner in which the split is accomplished on the corporate books is of no particular significance. It may, like a "true stock split", be supported entirely by a reduction in par value,7 and in such a case the
two terms may be considered synonymous. Or, unlike the
"true stock split," it may be accompanied by no change at
all in the par value' or even by an increase in par. Sometimes a modern stock split is supported by a charge to
capital surplus or paid-in surplus; or, it may be supported
by a charge in part to capital surplus, in part to paid-in
surplus, or, in whole or in part, to earned surplus." Even,
' McCormick v. Frisch, 199 Md. 181, 186, 85 A. 2d 793 (1952). See also:
CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1946) 483.
5For a clear statement of the difference between a stock dividend and
a stock split, see the remarks of Leland I. Doan, President of Dow Chemical
Co., at the annual stockholders' meeting of September 12, 1956. Among
other things, he observed:
"... If you declare 'a stock dividend of 25 or 50 or 100%, it in no way
reflects your earnings performance and really amounts to a stock split
rather than a dividend because the market value of the shares is
usually reduced proportionately . . ."
6 The Rules of the New York -Stock Exchange cited above in footnote
2 provide that distributions of between 25% and 1000o of the stock
previously outstanding are presumptively splits, but that each distribution
falling in this category must be independently analyzed to determine its
proper status.
7As, for example, the 1953 stock split of American Gas & Electric
Company, supported entirely by a reduction in par from $10 to $5 per
share. This distribution was referred to in Donaldson v. Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 214 Md. 421, 425, 135 A. 2d 433 (1957).
8As, for example, the two Texas Company splits discussed in the
Donaldson case, ibid.
' As, for example, the 1956 split of American Gas & Electric Co., also
discussed in the Donaldson case, supra, n. 7, where par value was increased from $5 to $10 per share.
20 In
the Donaldson case, 214 Md. 421, 426, 135 A. 2d 433 (1957), the
court considered the 1951 split of American Gas & Electric Company
which was partly supported by a charge to capital surplus and to earned
surplus. The General Electric split of 1954, considered in the Apponyl
BALLANTINE,
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however, where some or all of the par value of the new
stock is supported by a capitalization of earned surplus,
the distribution is not a "dividend."" It does not represent
a "severance" of corporate assets in any sense of the word.
It differs essentially from a "stock dividend" in that it does
not represent a substitute for or an increment to an ordinary
cash dividend. To the extent that earnings are capitalized,
it may, to be sure, resemble a large or hybrid stock dividend. But corporate acts are to be judged in terms of their
cause, their effect and their outward appearance. One who
equates a modern stock split with a stock dividend does so
because of some of their similarities in effect and in outward appearance but despite their fundamental differences
in motivating cause.

II -

THE LAW AS TO

PRE-1929

TRUSTS

Gregg, 2

In the case of Thomas v.
decided in 1894, the
Court of Appeals was asked to determine how a 20% stock
dividend declared and paid by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in 1892 should be treated for trust accounting purposes. The question was one of first impression in this
State, and the court found itself "not helped, but rather
embarrassed"'1 by the large number of relevant and conflicting decisions in other States.
The court first reviewed the cases decided in Massachusetts, the decisions now forming the basis of the socalled "Massachusetts Rule." Its basic principle is that
"ordinarily a dividend declared in stock is to be deemed
capital, and a dividend in money is to be deemed income .. ."14 Although easy to apply, the rule seemed
case, 220 Md. 275, 152 A. 2d 184 (1959), represented the capitalization of
earned surplus and capital reduction surplus.
",See: Barber, Are Accounting Requirements for Stock Dividends Ob8oletef, published in the November, 1958 issue of "The Analysts Journal",
a publication of the National Federation of Financial Analysts Societies.
The author points out (at p. 70) that in modern corporate accounting
practice, the traditional distinctions between the various surplus accounts have lost most of their significance, and that today the balances
in these funds are switched around for tax reasons, for labor bargaining
purposes and a host of other motives totally unrelated to the distribution
of income to stockholders.
"78 Md. 545, 28 A. 565 (1894).
Ibid., 549.
"'Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, 559 (1890); Minot v. Paine, 99
Mass. 101 (1868) ; 2 ScorT, TRuSTS (1956), § 236.5. The states which followed the Massachusetts Rule and those which followed the Pennsylvania
Rule are catalogued in a Note, 44 A.L.R. 2d 1277. A third and much less
popular rule is known as the "Kentucky Rule" which awards all extraordinary dividends, whether of stock or cash, to the life tenant. This
rule was abrogated by judicial decision. Bowles v. Stilley's Executor, 267
S.W. 2d 707, 44 A.L.R. 2d 1273 (Ky. 1954).
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arbitrary and uncomprising. Then the court went on to
consider the Pennsylvania Rule emanating from the early
leading case, Earp's Appeal. 15 This case required the apportionment of a stock dividend between principal and income in proportion to the corporate earnings accumulated
prior to the testator's death and those accumulated after
his death. This rule is difficult to apply but represents an
attempt to balance the equities between two classes of
trust beneficiaries.
Faced with this sharp cleavage between the Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania Rules, our Court of Appeals
in Thomas v. Gregg adopted the rule which seemed at the
time to bring the fairest result in the case at bar. The
directors of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad had, in this
instance, made it plain that the 20% stock dividend was
justified as a matter of business policy because it was
fully supported by current earnings. A clearer example
could scarcely be found, therefore, to illustrate a stock
dividend as above defined - a distribution paid in stock as
a substitute for a cash dividend. It seemed unfair to the
life tenant to invoke the Massachusetts Rule, and thereby
to assign the entire dividend to principal, thus denying the
life tenant the right to share in a distribution of corporate earnings which was clearly labeled as such by the
paying corporation. Influenced largely by these equitable
considerations, the Court of Appeals adopted the Pennsylvania Rule in Thomas v. Gregg, and directed an apportionment of the 20% stock dividend which the trustee in
that case had received.
The next case in this series is Quinn v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. 16 Here, a testamentary trustee, holding shares
of stock in the Canton Company, received from that corporation an extraordinary cash dividend of $4,000. Canton
had maintained a sinking fund for the payment of certain
bonds of the Union Railroad, but this fund was later freed
of the obligation when Northern Central Railway Company, for valuable consideration, agreed to pay all subsequent installments of interest and also the principal on
maturity. The cash and ground rents in the sinking fund
thus having been released, the directors of Canton decided
to keep the ground rents and to distribute most of the cash
to the stockholders. Out of the $4,000 received by the
trustee from this distribution, $3,814 had been earned prior
to the testator's death, and the balance of $186 had been
'528 -Pa.868 (1857).
93 Md. 285, 48 A. 85 (1901).
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earned since the inception of the trust. The lower court,
relying on Thomas v. Gregg, decreed an apportionment
between principal and income in the same ratio.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Distinguishing Thomas
v. Gregg in that it had involved a 20% stock dividend, not
an extraordinary cash dividend, and that what was here
distributed "had not been capitalized", the court held the
entire $4,000 to be income distributable to the life tenants.
Even though more than 90% of the cash distributed had
been earned prior to the inception of the trust, the remaindermen were not allowed to share in the distribution
at all.
The decision is patently inconsistent with Thomas v.
Gregg. In the earlier case, the dividend was held apportionable in respect of earnings realized before and after
the inception of the trust. In the later case, 100% of the
distribution - and an extraordinary cash dividend at that
- was awarded to the life tenants even though more than
90% of the dividend had been earned before their right
to share in the income had begun. 7
In the earlier case, the court held that as to earnings
accumulated "before the life estate commenced, it is but
just and in accordance with the intention of the testator,
so far as it is shown, that such earnings be treated as
capital."'18 In the Quinn case, this theory of fairness was
ignored, and most of the earnings which had accrued
"before the life estate commenced" were nonetheless
ordered paid to the life tenant.
One of the arguments in support of the adoption of the
Pennsylvania Rule in Thomas v. Gregg is that the 20%
stock dividend there involved was the equivalent of an
extraordinary cash dividend which the directors of the
paying corporation elected to pay in stock. To apply the
Massachusetts Rule to these facts would cause the distribution to be paid entirely to the life tenants if paid in cash,
but entirely to the remaindermen if paid in stock. The
inconsistency of this result (which is more apparent than
17When the distribution is capitalized, as it was in Thomas v. Gregg,
8upra, n. 12, both life tenant and remainderman share in Its benefits
without an apportionment. The new stock will ultimately be paid to
the remainderman, and meanwhile the life tenant receives the income
therefrom. The effect of apportionment is to give the life tenant a larger
and more immediate benefit, but the remainderman still shares in the
distribution. In the Quinn case, aupra, n. 16, however, where the dividend
"had not been capitalized", the payment to the life tenant in its entirety deprived the remainderman of any share at all in the distribution. A fortiori,
therefore, should there not be an apportionment where earnings made
before the inception of the trust are distributed without capitalization?
18Supra, n. 12, 560.
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real) seemed to justify the invocation of the Pennsylvania Rule of apportionment, so that both classes of trust
beneficiaries might be permitted to share in a distribution
of income covering their respective interests in the estate
-and
regardless of whether the directors of the paying
corporation elected to make the distribution in stock or in
cash.19
If this is the rationale of Thomas v. Gregg, it was certainly disregarded in Quinn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
And it is not without interest that the Quinn case relies
for its authority primarily on Massachusetts cases and the
decisions of other states following the Massachusetts Rule,2"
even though the State of Maryland had by that time been
committed to the Pennsylvania Rule by the decision in
Thomas v. Gregg. Surprisingly enough, the Quinn case
is frequently
cited as a decision under the Pennsylvania
21
Rule.
This brings us to the next case dealing with an extraordinary
cash dividend - Foard v. Safe Deposit & Trust
22
Co.
In this case, a corporation sold certain stock which it
had purchased with earnings accumulated prior to the
testator's death. Out of the proceeds of sale, the corporation paid a 100% cash dividend labeled as a "special distribution" to its stockholders, of whom one was the trustee
in the case at bar. The Court of Appeals held "this unusual
dividend" traceable to the sale of assets "which had been
bought with earnings of the company prior to Mr. Foard's
death, and prior even to the making of his will. '28 Consequently, the entire $50,000 received by the trustee was
held to be principal, and no part thereof became payable
to the life tenant.
Obviously, this result is inconsistent with the holding
in the Quinn case. There, the dividend was made possible
by the liquidation of a sinking fund. Here, the dividend
19See particularly the reasoning of the court, 78 Md. 545, 557, and the
rhetorical question and answer:
"... Are they [the life tenants] to be deprived of all interest in
the dividend simply because it was made payable 'in common stock
of the company?' We think not."
'0Some commentators writing contemporaneously with the Quinn decision were even led to believe that the case "closely limits if it does not
virtually overrule" Thomas v. Gregg. See, for example: 2 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS (1908) 1150, § 1389.
nAtlantic Coast Line Dividend Cases, 102 Md. 73, 79, 61 A. 295
(1905); Northern Central Dividend Cases, 126 Md. 16, 28, 29, 94 A. 338
(1915) ; Krug v. Mercantile T. & D. Co., 133 Md. 110, 114, 104 A. 414 (1918).
-122 Md. 476, 89 A. 724 (1914).
-Ibid., 481.
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was made possible by the liquidation of certain stocks held
by the paying corporation. In the Quinn case, the court
emphasized the fact that the paying corporation had decided to keep the ground rents which it had received from
the sinking fund, and to distribute to the stockholders the
cash received from the same source. This suggested that
what was kept was "capital" and what was distributed was
"income." In the Foard case, however, the whole amount
distributed was held to be capital.
Finally, it is of interest that in the Foardcase the entire
distribution was supported by earnings accumulated prior
to the inception of the trust, and in the Quinn case substantially all of the distribution also represented earnings
for this same period. Yet in the Foard case the whole
distribution was held to be principal, and in the Quinn
case the whole distribution was held to be income.24
We now turn to the pre-1929 cases dealing with stock
distributions.
In the Atlantic Coast Line Dividend Cases25 decided
in 1905, the court held a 20% stock dividend and an extra
5% dividend payable in certificates of indebtedness, both
of which had been charged to "surplus net earnings", were
apportionable dividends under the Pennsylvania Rule.
Since they were supported entirely by earnings accumulated since the death of the testator, they were payable
entirely to the life tenant. This case is a straightforward
reaffirmation of the Pennsylvania Rule as stated in Thomas
v. Gregg, supra.
The next case in the series is Coudon v. Updegraff,26 in
which the trustees had received a 100% "stock dividend"
from the Whitaker Iron Company. This case is far more
significant because of its facts than for any particular contribution to the law. In the latter respect, the case merely
reaffirms once more the Pennsylvania Rule, relying
especially on The Atlantic Coast Line Dividend Cases. The
facts presented in Coudon v. Updegraff seem of special
interest, however, first, because the distribution was equal
to 100% of the stock previously outstanding, and, secondly,
"The inconsistency between the Quinn and Foard cases has elsewhere
been noted. See 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS (1948) 337 (§ 845), n. 34, indicating that
although the Maryland court in the Foard case "purports to follow the
Pennsylvania Rule," the Quinn case seems "to the opposite effect." In
Lindau v. Community Fund of Baltimore, 188 Md. 474, 479, 53 A. 2d 409
(1947), the court quoted with approval a statement from Matter of
Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913), indicating that extraordinary
cash dividends are apportionable. Query: What is the law today as to
extraordinary cash dividends in pre-1929 estates?
102 Md. 73, 61 A. 295 (1905).
"117 Md. 71, 83 A. 145 (1911).
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because the distribution was not accompanied by any
change in par value. This distribution thus becomes almost indistinguishable from the "modern stock split", as
hereinabove defined. This point will prove of special interest later when we consider the Donaldson and Apponyi
cases.
The next significant decision is entitled Northern Central Dividend Cases,2 7 an opinion dealing with several
trust estates which had received a 40% stock distribution
from the Northern Central Railroad. The distribution was
brought about by a dispute between the minority stockholders of Northern Central and the Pennsylvania Railroad, the majority stockholder. The minority had charged
that Northern Central had unreasonably accumulated its
profits without any dividends, all to the benefit of Pennsylvania and to the detriment of the minority interests.
As part of the settlement of this dispute, Northern Central
declared and paid a 40% stock dividend. The court held
the distribution to be apportionable under the Pennsylvania Rule.
In the resolution of Northern Central's stockholders
approving an increase in authorized capital sufficient to
cover the stock dividend, it was declared that the distribution was to be taken"... as and for a stock dividend upon the company's
present outstanding capital stock, representive of and
based on expenditures for additions and betterments
of the company's property made from time to time out
of its surplus earnings to a larger amount in the aggregate, and which might otherwise have been available
for and distributable as dividends among its stockholders, if the Directors had so determined....
In holding the distribution apportionable, the Court of
Appeals decided
"... to follow the precedent established in Quinn v. The
Safe Deposit and Trust Company, and in the Atlantic
Coast Line Dividend Cases, and hold the declarations
of the company and its stockholders that the dividend
represents earnings or income binding upon all parties
to these appeals."29
- 126 Md. 16, 94 A. 338 (1915).
' Ibid., 21. (Emphasis added.)
29 Supra, ns. 27, 28.
Some courts would hold that the corporate act of
dedicating earnings to capital creates an inequity which can only be
rectified by apportionment, but only to the extent that future dividends
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In defense of the decision in the Northern Central case,
one can argue that the stock distribution was really a threestep transaction telescoped into one - i. e. the corporation
could have used its earnings to pay a cash dividend, which,
in turn, the stockholders might then have reinvested in
the company through a subscription to new stock. Then
the company could have used the proceeds of the
stock subscription for "additions and betterments of the
company's property." This three-stage transaction, sometimes referred to as a "compulsory investment," would
have left the stockholders in exactly the same situation in
which they found themselves after the 40% stock dividend. Therefore, it can be argued, the stock dividend
should be treated as an apportionable distribution of income.
The fallacy in this argument lies in its major premise.
The corporation did not in fact distribute cash as income,
nor indeed was there any reinvestment by the shareholders
in new stock in the same company. Instead, the corporation had previously elected to capitalize its earnings by
spending them on capital improvements. Then, under a
good deal of pressure, it agreed to distribute to its stockholders shares of stock representing this additional capital.
The earnings, however, remained in the corporate till.
Manifestly, therefore, what the corporation did in fact was
quite different in form and substance from what in theory
it "could have done." 0
are limited thereby. Thus, for example, in the case of In re Terhune,
142 A. 2d 684 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1958), the court found it "necessary
to determine whether any funds which could benefit the life tenants in
the future have been irrevocably transferred to an account, the proceeds
of which will redound solely to the benefit of the remainderman." In that
case the capitalization of earnings by crediting capital surplus was held
not to require apportionment because under controlling corporate law
dividends could still be paid out of capital surplus. The earnings which
were credited to capital stock account, however, were placed "in a
category from which no future dividends could be declared", and hence
to that extent an apportionment was ordered. This rationale has been
repeatedly approved by the courts of New Jersey. Day v. Faulks, 79
N.J. Eq. 66, 81 A. 354 (1911), aff'd. 81 N.J. Eq. 173, 88 A. 384 (1912) ;
Plainfield Trust Co. v. Bowlby, 107 N.J. Eq. 68, 151 A. 545 (1930) ; In re
Wehrmane's Estate, 41, N.J. Super. 158, 124 A. 2d 334 (1956), aff'd. 23
N.J. 205, 128 A. 2d 681 (1957). The rule is now, apparently, In force in
Pennsylvania. In re Cunningham's Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A. 2d 72 (1959).
This so-called "New Jersey Rule" has been flatly rejected in Maryland.
Northern Central Dividend Cases, supra, n. 27; Apponyi v. MercantileSafe Deposit & Trust Co., 220 Md. 275, 152 A. 2d 184 (1959).
'OAdmittedly,
the expense and trouble of a public offering of securities
under modern federal regulation may have combined with tax considerations to stimulate the use of the modern stock split as a means of accomplishing the permanent conversion of accumulated earnings into working capital. Whatever the validity of this reasoning today, it can have
little application to the distribution of the Northern Central case in 1915.
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The next case on the list is Miller v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co.,81 also involving the same Northern Central dividend discussed above. This opinion adds nothing new to
the story of the Pennsylvania Rule in Maryland, but it
does emphasize that the date of the creation of the trust
is the significant date for purposes of applying the rules
of apportionment to original investments, and the acquisition date in the case of subsequently acquired investments.
Under the authority of this case, it would seem that the
death of an intervening life tenant after the testator's
death has no effect at all in applying the rules of apportionment. In other words, after a particular distribution
has been characterized as apportionable, then the portion
allocable to income is payable to the party who is currently
entitled to the income from the trust. 2 The Pennsylvania Rule as applied in Maryland does not require apportionment of income between successive life tenants.
The Miller case was followed by the decision in Baldwin
v. Baldwin,88 an opinion which explains the "intact value
test" as part of the rules of apportionment in this State.
It holds that the "actual" or "intact" value of the stock in
the hands of the trustee at the inception of the trust, determined with relation to the corporate books and not to
market value, must be maintained for the benefit of the
remaindermen, and to the extent that any apportionable
stock dividend would impair that book value, the application of the Pennsylvania Rule must be modified.m
The Baldwin case is also of interest because, like
Coudon v. Updegraff, it involved a 100% distribution of
stock, supported entirely by earnings accumulated since
the inception of the trust. On the surface, therefore, both
cases dealt with stock distributions which meet our defini127 Md. 610, 96 A. 766 (1916).
12In the Miller case, 127 Md. 610, 615, 96 A. 766 (1916), the court indicated
that the determination of the beneficiary entitled to the income is to be
made as of the declaration date of the dividend. Presumably, this means in
the absence of a specified record date. Compare: 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23,
§ 40(c) (2); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1956) 1809, § 236.2.
-159 Md. 175, 150 A. 282 (1930).
" The same rule obtains in Pennsylvania. In re King's Estate, 361
Pa. 629, 66 A. 2d 68 (1949); In re Stokes' Estate, 240 Pa. 277, 87 A.
971 (1913) ; Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344, 21 A. 438 (1891) ; Biddle's Appeal,
99 Pa. 278 (1882) ; Moss' Appeal, 83 Pa. 264 (1877). In Arrott's Estate,
383 Pa. 228, 118 A. 2d 187 (1955), however, the Pennsylvania court held
that as to securities purcha8ed by the trust (as distinguished from those
originally acquired) the market value at the time of the purchase is the
intact value to be preserved. The Maryland courts have not followed this
sensible refinement. Query: What better method could be found to measure
the corpus to be preserved "intact" than the dollar amount of cash
corpus which was used to buy the investment?
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tion of a "modern stock split." Again, this point will prove
of interest later when we take up the Donaldson case.
The latest stock distribution case in the series is Lindau
v. Community Fund of Baltimore." Although the case was
decided after the adoption of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act, it was not governed by the Act because the
trust estate was created prior to June 1, 1939.36 Even apart
from this fact, however, the Act would not in any event
have controlled because the trust instrument contained
the following provisions dealing with principal and income:
.. . all stock dividends to the extent that they are
paid out of current earnings for the current fiscal or
preceding year shall likewise be treated as income as
of the date of their payment; but all other stock dividends shall be treated as corpus of the trust estate."3 7
In the light of this mandate in the controlling instrument,
the court ruled that a 20% stock dividend was apportionable. The case is of special interest today because it shows
how the discredited Pennsylvania Rule can be invoked as
to post-1939 transfers when the will or deed of
trust
38
contains a provision similar to that quoted above.
Although the Lindau case marks the last in the series
of decision dealing with distributions of stock of the distributing company and their apportionment under the
Pennsylvania Rule (except for the Donaldson and Apponyi
cases to be considered separately hereinbelow), the picture
would not be complete without a brief discussion of several
other decisions involving questions of principal and income
and hence directly or indirectly related to the Pennsylvania Rule.
(1) In Smith v. Hooper,3 9 the court held that profits
realized by a trustee on the sale of capital assets (i. e.
profits which are customarily referred to these days as
''capital gains") do not constitute income which must be
distributed to the life tenant. Accordingly, there was no
need for applying the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment. 0
85188 Md. 474, 53 A. 2d 409 (1947).
m The effective date of the Uniform 'Principal and Income Act, 7 MD.

CoDn (1957) Art. 75B.
81Supra, n. 35, 477.
117 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75B, § 2, permits the testator or settlor to
"direct the manner of ascertainment of income and principal and the
apportionment of receipts and expenses . .
8995 Md. 16, 54 A. 95 (1902).
40The rule is apparently otherwise in Pennsylvania. McKeown's Estate,
263 Pa. 78, 106 A. 189 (1919).
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(2) In Safe Deposit v. Bowen,4 the court followed the
decision in Smith v. Hooper, and held that there was no
problem of apportionment where a trustee surrendered
preferred stock with unpaid accumulated dividends in exchange for cash, new preferred stock, debenture notes, and
common stock. This reorganization was likened to a sale,
and the new securities
were held to belong to corpus "in
'4 2
their entirety."
(3) In Girdwood v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.," the
court held that rights to subscribe to new stock, when exercised by the trustee, constituted corpus of the estate,
and, accordingly, no problem of apportionment under the
Pennsylvania Rule was raised.
(4) In Ex Parte Humbird,44 the court ruled that the
trustee's profit realized on the sale of its timber lands and
cash dividends paid to a trustee by a lumber company out
of the proceeds of sale of the company's timber lands,
were, in both cases, corpus. The profits on the sale of trust
assets were clearly governed by Smith v. Hooper. The
cash dividend, however, was more troublesome because of
the argument that it should be distributed in toto to the life
tenants as an extraordinary cash dividend under the
authority of Quinn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. The court
of Appeals ruled, however, that the source of the dividend
controlled-in this case the liquidation of the corporation's timber land - that this dividend does not represent
income earned in the ordinary course of the company's
business, and that it must therefore, be treated in its entirety as non-distributable corpus.
(5) In Washington County Hospital v. Hagerstown
Trust Co.,45 the court relied on the distinction that the
profits there distributed were made in the ordinary course
- 188 Md. 482, 53 A. 2d 413 (1947).
"A recent case in Pennsylvania came to the opposite conclusion, applying the Pennsylvania Rule in a trust estate created before the adoption of
the Uniform Principal and Income Act in that state in 1945. In re King's
Estate, 361 Pa. 629, 66 A. 2d- 68 (1949). There, the new stock received in
exchange for the accumulated arrearages in dividends on the old preferred
was held distributable as income after the Intact value of the old stock had
been preserved.
"143 Md. 245, 122 A. 132 (1923) ; the rule is apparently otherwise in
Pennsylvania, Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149, 140 A. 862 (1928),
although the prior cases were In some conflict. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290
Pa. 457, 139 A. 200 (1927) ; Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. 143, 34 A. 577 (1896) ;
Wiltbank's Appeal, 64 Pa. 256 (1870). The Jones case held that stocks
purchased through the exercise of rights are to be treated as an apportionable stock dividend, but in the later case of Waterhouse's Estate, 308
Pa. 422, 162 A. 295 (1932), it was held that the proceeds from the sale of
rights are presumptively principal.
"114 Md. 627, 80 A. 209 (1911).
124 Md. 1, 91 A. 787 (1914).
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of the distributing corporation's business, and not, as in the
Humbird case, from "economic laws operating independently of the corporate agency or existence."4 6 This suggests that profits derived from the sale of land will be
treated as income where the corporation actively contributes to its enhancement in value and where such a sale is a
regular part of the corporation's business. On the other
hand, if similar real estate is owned by another corporation which indolently relies on "economic laws" to raise
the value of its property, then the profits on the sale will
be treated as principal. The distinction seems somewhat
nebulous.
(6) In Spedden v. Norton,47 the court ruled that "liquidating dividends" payable in cash by a real estate development company should be treated as corpus in the
hands of the trustee until the intact value of the stock at
the time of the inception of the trust has been recouped.
Thereafter, presumably, these dividends would represent
a division of profits and hence distributable as income.
In this respect, it is interesting to note this flat statement by the court:
".**An extraordinary dividend declared after the
testator's death from earnings realized before that
event, would be'48 allocated to the corpus of the trust
under his will.
In support of this proposition, the court cited eight cases,
including Quinn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. As hereinbefore noted, the Quinn case held just the reverse. An extraordinary cash dividend declared and paid after the testator's death derived to the extent of about 90% from earnings realized before that event, was in that case held to be
not principal but income in its entirety and payable 100%
to the life tenant.
(7) The next case in this group is Krug v. Mercantile
Trust and Deposit Co.,49 where a stock dividend payable
in stock of another corporation was held to be income.
This distributing corporation was held to be in the business
of buying and selling securities, so that in a very real sense
the profits distributed were earnings realized in the regular course of its business. The distribution would have
Supra, n. 44, 640.

' 159 Md. 101, 150 A. 15 (1930).

Compare Jones Estate, 377 Pa. 473,
105 A. 2d 353 (1954), holding that liquidating dividends are apportionable
in that state.
Ibid., 105.
"133 Md. 110, 104 A. 414 (1918).
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been treated as income even under the Principal and Income Act. 0
5 0 a the Court of Appeals
(8) In Rosenburg v. Lombardi,
held that capital gains dividends of regulated investment
companies are to be treated as income of pre-1939 trust
estates. Since the investment company's securities profits
are earned in the ordinary course of its business, this holding is consistent with the principles laid down in the Krug
case, supra, and
with the weight of authority in other
°
jurisdictions. b
III -

THE LAW AS TO TRUSTS CREATED BETWEEN

1929 AND 1939

In 1929 the State of Maryland made its first attempt
to solve this problem by statute. It was not a signal
success. The statute provided as follows:
"All rents, annuities, dividends and periodical payments in the nature of income, payable under the provisions of any will, deed or other instrument executed
after the first day of July, 1929 shall like interest on
money lent, be considered as accruing from day to day,
and shall be apportionable in respect of time accordingly, unless otherwise expressly stated by the instrument under which they are payable; but no acW 7 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 75B, § 5(1). The Act follows the Massachusetts Rule in holding that dividends paid in securities of companies
other than the paying corporation are to be treated as Income. Courts
of other jurisdictions have held that, even under the Pennsylvania Rule,
stock dividends payable In securities of corporations other than the paying
corporation, when charged to earned surplus on the books of the paying
corporation, are income. See, for example, the New York eases dealing
with the -Standard Oil distributions, collected In Note, 130 A.L.R. 492, 591.
10 Decided May 12, 1960; opini on not yet reported. (Case No. 163,
September Term, 1959.)
Wb The out-of-state court decisions have generally held such capital gains
dividends to be income. See: In re Byrne's Estate, 81 N.Y.S. 2d 23 (1948) ;
In re Bruce's Trust, 81 N.Y.S. 2d 25 (1948) ; In re Hurd's Will, 120 N.Y.S.
2d 103 (1953) ; In re Appleby's Estate, 175 N.Y.S. 2d 176 (1958) ; In re
Rosenthal's Estate, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 483 (1951) ; Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.
2d 874 (Mo. 1957) ; Lovett Estate (No. 2), 78 D. & C. Rep. 21 (Orphans
Court of Luzerne Co., Pa., 1951). However, these cases have met with
strong criticism from some learned commentators and strong support from
others. See, Shattuck, Capital Gains Distributions - Principal or Income,
88 Trusts & Estates 160, 429 (1949) ; Young, A Dissent on Capital Gains
Distributions, 88 Trusts & Estates 280 (1949) ; Rogers, Capital Gains Distributions, 90 Trusts & Estates 300 (1951) ; Rogers, Capital Gains Dividend8 - A Suggestion for Draftsmen, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 79 (1951);
Anderson, Should Capital Gains Distributions Be Principal or Income?,
90 Trusts & Estates 331 (1951) ; Putney, Capital Gains Dividends, 95 Trusts
& Estates 22 (1956) ; Oohan -and Dean, Apportionment of Stock Proceeds,
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 181 (1957) ; 3 SCOTT, TRuSTS (1956) 1844, § 236.14.

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

tion shall be brought therefor until the expiration of
the period for which the apportionment is made."'"
The application of this statute to the problem of apportionment in Maryland was first considered by the Court of
Appeals in Zell v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,52 decided in
1938. There, it was held that the statute above quoted had
no application to an ordinary cash dividend paid by a
company with an irregular dividend-paying record because the dividend was not paid with reference to any
fixed period of time. The English authorities so holding
seemed especially persuasive, since the Maryland Act
followed closely the language of the English Act on Apportionments. 3
Although the Zell case illustrates the ineffectiveness of
the 1929 Act, it is difficult to find fault with the reasoning
of the court as applied to the facts there presented. The
case does show, however, how unwise it is to extend the
concept of apportionment to all corporate distributions.
The apportionment of dividends between successive beneficiaries may be appealing to one's sense of fair play, but
experience has shown that the only forms of income which
lend themselves to this treatment are those in which the
factor of time is an inherent characteristic. Thus, we have
heard little or no criticism of the use of daily accrual
tables for apportioning such fixed periodic payments as
rent, annuities, interest on loans, etc. But when we apply
these same rules to other forms of income which are not
pegged to the passage of time, we become engulfed in
a maze of troubles - troubles which are graphically illustrated by the Maryland decisions dealing with the Pennsylvania Rule and the 1929 Act.
No better illustration of this point could be found than
in the strange case of Heyn v. Fidelity Trust Company,5 4
decided by the Court of Appeals in February 1938, only a
few weeks after the Zell case. An eight-page majority
opinion by Judge Sheehan, the author of the Zell decision,
was modified after reargument by a seventeen-page
majority opinion written by Judge Offutt. Judge Parke
registered a vigorous twenty-five page dissent.
LAWS (1929) Ch. 495, 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 305(c).
173 Md. 518, 196 A. 298 (1938).
In re Jowitt (1922) L. R., 2 Ch. Div. 442; In re Muirhead (1916)
L. R. 2 Ch. 181; In re Wakely (1920) 2 Ch. 205; In re Sale (1913) 2
Ch. 697; Carr v. Griffith (1879) 12 Ch. D. 655; In re Taylor's Trusts
(1905), 1 Ch. 734; In re Armitage (1893) 3 Ch. 337; Marjoribanks v.
Dansey (1923) 2 Oh. 307; In re Sandbach (1933) Ch. D. 505.
174 Md. 639, 197 A. 292 (1938).
"MD.
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The case dealt with several different classes of dividends, but for present purposes the most interesting facet is
the holding that a payment on account of arrearages in
dividends on cumulative preferred stock is an extraordinary distribution not governed by any fixed period of
time and, hence, not controlled by the 1929 Act. Having
come to this conclusion, the majority of the court then
fell back on the Pennsylvania Rule to find the distribution
entirely income paid out of earnings accumulated after
the inception of the trust, and, hence, payable to the life
tenant.5 5 This overruled Judge Sheehan's previous conclusion that this same distribution was in the nature of a
liquidating dividend, and was to be treated entirely as
corpus.
As a result of the Heyn decision, it would seem that
the 1929 Act has no force at all today except as to the
apportionment of regular cash dividends, interest, rent,
etc. on a daily accrual basis, in trusts created in the 19291939 period.
The major contribution of the Heyn case may be found
in Judge Parke's brilliant dissent. After reviewing the
earlier Maryland cases on apportionment, he urged the
adoption of a "simple, arbitrary, universal rule" which
like the Massachusetts Rule, would make in most cases
for substantial justice.
Any hope that the 1929 Act might bring this result
had been surely and swiftly killed by the decisions in the
Zell and Heyn cases, but the Legislature was quick to
respond to Judge Parke's suggestion. In 1939 Maryland
became one of the first states to enact the Uniform Principal and Income Act. 56

IV - THE LAW AS TO POST-1939 TRUSTS GOVERNED
BY THE UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT.
The Principal and Income Act is one of the most successful products of the National Conference on Uniform
State Laws. There is perhaps no better test of a statute's
true merit than its effect on litigation, and on this score the
Principal and Income Act passes with flying colors. Since
"Note the seeming inconsistency between this result and that In Safe
Deposit v. Bowen, 188 Md. 482, 53 A. 2d 413 (1947), discussed in text,
supra, p. 101.

NOnly five states had adopted the Act prior to 1939- namely Florida,
Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon and Virginia. Three other states besides Maryland joined the group in 1939: Alabama, Connecticut and Utah.
To date, 21 states have adopted the Act, including Pennsylvania, the
home state of the Pennsylvania Rule (1945).
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its adoption in Maryland in 1939, now over twenty years
ago, not one single case has reached the Court of Appeals
for a construction of its terms. In other states, the record is
almost as good. 7 The statute is clear in its language,
simple in its application and uniform in its result.
For all practical purposes, the Principal and Income
Act adopts the Massachusetts Rule. All distributions in
stock of the paying corporation, whether in the form of
stock dividends or stock splits, are treated as principal,
and all distributions in cash are treated as income.5" When
the trustee has the option of receiving a distribution in
cash or in stock of the paying corporation, it is treated as
the equivalent of a cash dividend and, therefore, income,
regardless of the election made by the trustee. 9 Distributions payable in securities or obligations of other corporations are treated as income. 0 Rights to subscribe to
securities of the distributing corporation and the proceeds
of sale thereof are deemed to be principal, but rights to
subscribe to securities in other corporations, and the proceeds of sale thereof, are treated as income." The Act contains special rules governing liquidations, mergers, consolidations and reorganizations.2
As noted in the Lindau case, the Principal and Income
Act permits the testator to prescribe some other method
for the "ascertainment of income and principal and the
apportionment of receipts and expenses."6' 3 Sometimes it
is necessary to resort to this privilege to satisfy the wishes
of the creator of the trust, and some testators will want to
leave the matter to the discretion of the trustee. But all
too often, it seems, the draftsmen of modern wills are prone
to copy one of several forms dealing with principal and
income, forms which were in vogue during the hey-day of
the Pennsylvania Rule. Generally speaking, these clauses
contribute nothing but confusion when used in present-day
trust instruments.6 4 The subject has been adroitly covered
"See the publication of the Act in Uniform Laws Annotated with
annotations.
17 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 753, § 5(1).
Ibid.
Ibid. Cf. n. 50, 8upra.
a7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 75B, § 5(2).
U7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 76B, § 5(3).
188 Md. 474, 477, 53 A. 2d 409 (1947). This deed of trust contained
a clause reading:
"All stock dividends to the extent they are paid out of current
earnings for the current fiscal or preceding year shall likewise be
treated as income as of the date of their payment; but all other
stock dividends shall be treated as corpus ......
"Query: In the clause used in the Lindau trust and quoted in the
previous note, what is a "stock dividend?" Does the term include a
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by the Statute, and most attempts to deal with it in the
controlling instrument accomplish nothing except to bring
the case back within the discredited and discarded Pennsylvania Rule.

V. - THE DONALDSON AND APPONyi CASES
The Donaldson case65 presented the following facts:
In 1957 the life tenant of a testamentary trust created by
a testator who died in 1908 brought a bill in equity to
compel an apportionment of three "modern stock splits,"
i. e. those of The Texas Company in 1951 and 1955 and of
American Gas & Electric Co. in 1956. The Texas Company distributions were each 2-for-i, and the American
Gas & Electric Co. distribution was 1%-for-1. Neither distribution of The Texas Company was supported by any reduction in par value, and the American Gas & Electric Co.
distribution even involved an increase in par from $5.00
to $10.00 per share. None of the three distributions, therefore, qualified as a "true stock split" which traditionally
results only in a reduction in par value and a corresponding
increase in the number of shares outstanding.
The trustee argued that the "modern stock split" was
a different genre from the "true stock split", and that the
discredited Pennsylvania Rule should not be extended to
cover this new phenomenon of corporate finance.6 6 In support of this contention, the trustee pointed to the resolutions of the corporate directors establishing as a motive
for each distribution the reduction of market value of the
stock to levels more attractive to the average investor.
The trustee also stressed the Rules of the New York
Stock Exchange requiring the capitalization of market
value of the new shares in the case of stock dividends
representing 25% or less of the stock previously outstand"modern stock split" of the type discussed infra In the Donaldson and
Apponyl cases? Would the answer be different if the clause had directed
that "all stock dividends be treated as Income" without reference to the
capitalization of earnings? Would the entire stock distribution be payable
as income? Or would there still be an apportionment based on the three
tests of the Pennsylvania Rule? See: Matter of Fosdick, 4 N.Y. 2d 646,
152 N.E. 2d 228 (1958).
6 Donaldson v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 214 Md. 421, 135
A. 2d 433 (1957).
1 This contention was supported by the holding of the Surrogate's Court
of Monroe County, N.Y., In re Lindsay's Will, 11 Misc. 2d 374, 109
N.Y.S. 2d 600 (1952), but this decision was patently inconsistent with
other New York cases, such as In re Lissberger's Estate, 271 App. Div.
804, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 370 (1946); In re Strong's Will, 198 Misc. 7, 96 N.Y.S.
2d 75 (1950); and In re Davis' Estate, 11 Misc. 2d 372, 128 N.Y.S. 2d
152 (1953), the last named case involving ,the same 1951 Texas Oompany
split which was presented in Donaldson.
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ing.6 7 Distributions of 100 % or more of the stock previously
outstanding are, however, treated as splits, and only the
par value need be capitalized. Distributions between
25% and 100% are presumptively splits, but must be individually judged on their own facts. These rules, so
argued the trustee, show that in modern financial and accounting practice there is a very real distinction between
a small distribution of stock representing a division of
earnings and a large one representing a split-up of the
corporate equity into smaller lots at more attractive prices
for the average investor. The sharp increase in the number of these splits in the post-war period suggests further
that they are a by-product of the contemporary period of
inflation.
These arguments are persuasive but run afoul of the
principle of stare decisis. As we have already noted above,
6 8 and Baldwin v. Baldwin6 9 inboth Coudon v. Updegraff
volved the application of the Pennsylvania Rule of Apportionment to 100% "stock dividends" - distributions which
differ from our definition of "modern stock splits" only in
that they were not modern. This poses an interesting question for the student of jurisprudence: At what point must
the principle of stare decisis yield to changing social and
economic concepts? In his decision in the Circuit Court in
the Donaldson case Judge Reuben Oppenheimer answered
this question by saying: "Legal questions arising out of
corporate actions are no more to be decided in a vacuum
drained of the social and economic context of the times
in which we live than are questions of civil liberties and
due process of law."
The Court of Appeals reversed. Holding itself bound
by stare decisis, the court ordered an apportionment of the
three stock distributions received by the Donaldson trustee. Unless one is willing to accept Judge Oppenheimer's
jurisprudential approach, it is difficult to criticize the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In further defense of Donaldson, one may wonder what
formula the court could have devised to restrict the application of the Pennsylvania Rule to "modern stock splits"
and yet preserve its application to "stock dividends." The
Rules of the New York Stock Exchange might suffice for
distributions under its jurisdiction, but what about stocks
0 Discussed 8upra, n. 2. In this context, the term "market value" is
used in the sense of "current value adjusted for the effect of this distribution."
"117 Md. 71, 83 A. 145 (1912).
-159 Md. 175, 150 A. 282 (1930).
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not listed on this exchange? And what if these rules
should change? Would it be fair to resolve a question of
trust accounting in terms of such variable rules or even in
terms of a fixed listing agreement between the distributing
corporation and a stock exchange?7 0 Could it not be argued
that the decision of the lower court in the Donaldson case°
would have created as many problems as it would solve? a
As a result of the long line of Maryland decisions culminating in the Donaldson case, the Pennsylvania Rule in
this state may be said to involve the independent application of three tests, and the life tenant receives the least
number of shares resulting from each of them. These three
tests are as follows:
(1) The life tenant may receive no more than those shares
which represent the proportion of earnings capitalized.
Thus, if a 2-for-1 stock distribution of 100 shares were received by the trustee, equivalent to one share for each of
the 100 shares originally owned by the trust, and if the distribution were supported 80% by a charge to earned surplus and 20% to capital surplus, no more than 80 new
shares could be apportioned to income. The remaining
20 new shares, plus the 100 old ones, or 120 in all, would
stay in principal.
(2) The life tenant may receive no more than those
shares which represent earnings capitalized and earned
during the holding period of the stock by the trustee. Thus,
in the example given above, if the 80% charge to earned
surplus exceeded the earnings realized by the paying corporation during the period that the stock was held by the
trustee, so that, let us say, only 70 % of the total distribution
represented the capitalization of such earnings, then the
life tenant could receive no more than 70 shares out of
the 100 new shares paid to the trustee. The remaining 30
new shares, or 130 in all, would stay in principal. Manifestly, the application of this test introduces a factor of
approximation, if not guess-work, into the calculation, since
7°In the case of In re Terhune, 50 N.J. Super. 414, 142 A. 2d 684 (1958),
the New Jersey court refused to be bound by the listing agreement
between Socony Mobil Oil Co. and the New York Stock Exchange under
which earnings which are capitalized to support a stock dividend can
no longer be used to pay dividends even if credited to capital surplus
rather than capital stock account. Instead, the court insisted on looking
to controlling corporation law in applying the New Jersey Rule which
limits the apportionment to that portion of the capitalized earnings which
are credited to an account from which future cash dividends cannot be paid.
.. For a recent criticism of a stock exchange rule from a trust accounting
point of view, see McCaffrey, Stock Dividend or Split, 99 Trusts & Estates
366 (April 1960).
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precise earnings figures are rarely available for any given
holding period.
(3) The life tenant may receive no more than those
shares which would leave intact the book value of the
investment in the hands of the trustee reckoned as of its
acquisition date. Thus, in the example given above, if the
book value of the investment at the time of its acquisition
were, let us say, $10.00 per share, or a total of $1,000 for
the 100 shares originally owned by the trustee, and if, after
the stock distribution, the book value of the paying corporation's stock were $6.00 per share, then it would take
a total of 1 6 6 2/3 shares at $6.00 each to maintain in principal the original book value of $1,000. Hence, to avoid
an impairment of book value, only 33% shares of new
stock could be paid to the life tenant, and the remaining
662/3 shares would have to stay in principal. Since the book
value test, or Test No. 3, thus results in the least number
of shares to be apportioned to income from the application
of all three tests, it is the one which would be applied in
the hypothetical case presented. It would be noted, however, that the application of this test, like Test No. 2, introduces even more approximation and guess-work into
the calculation, since precise book value figures are also
rarely available for the two measuring dates. Moreover,
book values are even less indicative of intrinsic worth
than published earnings figures because a corporation's
various capital and surplus accounts may be affected by
corporate accounting practices which are wholly unrelated
to its business record.7 '
After the decision in the Donaldsoncase, there came the
case of Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Company v.
Apponyi,7 2 a consolidated test case instituted to clarify the
application of the above stated rules to the seven million
dollars worth of stock held by one trust company and subject to the Donaldson case. In this latest, if not the last
word on the subject, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the
Donaldson rule even where it required the distribution, as
income to a life tenant, of $137,000 worth of stock in a
7See: PATON, ADVANCED ACCOTNTING (1947) 347, commenting on the
widespread depression practice of writing down the value of assets in
plant account and charging the write-down to a capital reduction surplus.
One large company is reported thus to have written off $50,000,000 in
plant account ait one fell swoop. If this company had later made a sflck
distribution subject to apportionment under the Donaldson case, the "book
value test" would have been something like an elastic yardstick. The day
before the write-dbwn, the test would have given one result, and on the
day 2after, a very different one.
- 20 Md. 275, 152 A. 2d 184 (1959).
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trust estate of about $450,000. 7 ' The court rejected the
trustee's contention that, in applying the book value test,
adjustments should be made for changes in the purchasing
power of the dollar, and ruled that the modern stock split
as hereinabove defined is to be treated as an apportionable
"stock dividend" to the extent that earnings are capitalized.7 4 Hereafter, it would seem immaterial that the paying
corporation may have labeled the distribution as a "split",
a "split-up" or words to that effect. To the extent that the
three tests of the Pennsylvania Rule are satisfied, the distribution is apportionable regardless of its label.75
The law is "settled," said the court, "and we shall not
unsettle it." In other words, the Pennsylvania Rule is
as to pre-1939 trusts not governed by the Unihere to stay
76
form Act.
Eventually, the problem will solve itself by the passage
of time, but, meanwhile, and possibly for another seventyfive or hundred years, the trustees of this State will have
to struggle with the application of the Rule to an ever increasing number of new situations - regular stock dividends designed to effect distribution of a company's entire
net annual income,7 7 stock dividends and splits issued in
"'The
distributions involved in the consolidated cases were the General
Electric split of 1954, the American Cyanamid split of 1957, as well as
the same Texas Co. and American Gas & Electric Co. splits which were
presented in Donaldson. Of these, and by far the largest was the General
Electric split of 1954 which the New York courts had held apportionable
under the Pennsylvania Rule. In re Fosdick's Trust, 4 N.Y. 2d 646, 152
N.E. 2d 228 (1958). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held otherwise
in In re Cunningham's Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A. 2d 72 (1959). For a

discussion of the recent Pennsylvania cases, see Oohan, Pandora's Boxx
Revisited, 98 Trusts & Estates 655 (1959), and Niles, Fosdick, Cunningham and Chaos, 98 Trusts & Estates 924 (1959).
1' This proposed "refinement" of the Rule was suggestive of the recent
Pennsylvania case. In re Harvey's Estate, 395 Pa. 62, 149 A. 2d 104 (1959),
which permitted the book value of the investment in stock of an insurance
company to be adjusted to reflect changes in the market value of the
insurance
company's invested portfolio.
7
See: In re Tealdi's Trust, 16 Misc. 2d 685, 182 N.Y.S. 2d 68 (1958),
dealing specifically with the problem of nomenclature and holding that
Standard Oil and Proctor & Gamble distributions, both labeled as "stock
splits" or "split-ups", are to be treated as "stock dividends" to the extent
that earnings are capitalized.
"0Although the trustee's contentions in the Apponyi case met with
scant favor in the Court of Appeals, they were given a gracious nod of
approval in a recent case note in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 108 Pa. L. Rev. 147 (1959). The Note concludes with the statement: "The argument made by the trustee in the present case offers a
reasonable solution to the problems of fulfilling the settlor's intent, compensates for Inflation and coincides with more recent views on the nature
of corporate stock distributions."
" See: for example, the unusual announcement of Commonwealth Edison
Co. of September 2, 1958, that henceforth it expects to pay a base quarterly
cash dividend and also an annual "supplementary stock dividend" substantially equivalent to the balance of the company's net annual earnings.
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connection with the consolidation of two or more companies,7" death sentence spin-offs in compliance with orders
under federal regulatory statutes,7 9 and a host of other
hybrid corporate transactions on a scale which was never
dreamed of when Thomas v. Gregg was decided in 1894.0
The application of the Pennsylvania Rule to modern
corporate distributions also causes serious inconveniences
in trust administration. The calculation of the American
Gas & Electric Co. apportionment in Donaldson required
the determination of corporate earnings and book values
for five different acquisition dates and their application
to eleven different sets of mathematical computations
stretching out over three folded printed pages in the record extract. The court referred casually to "these complicated calculations", but anyone who has shared the experience of studying them cannot but be appalled at their
complexity. "These complicated calculations" conjure up
the vision of a conscientious lawyer or trust officer trying
in vain to comply with the law against insuperable odds.
The late Judge Parke, himself a distinguished country
lawyer, visualized this same picture when he extolled the
simplicity of the Massachusetts Rule and urged in his dissent in the Heyn case that the 1929 Act be construed so
78
As, for example, the 1958 stock distributions of Springfield Fire &
Marine Co. in connection with the acquisition of Monarch Life Insurance
Co.
"For example, the stock divestiture provisions of the federal court
decree which were upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 189 (1944), a leading anti-trust case.
" Another serious complication develops from the application of principles of conflict of laws to the apportionment problem. Query: If the
Apponyi trust had been created by a Massachusetts domiciliary under a
will made and probated in that state but naming a Maryland trust company as trustee, would the Massachusetts Rule or the Pennsylvania Rule
have been applied? Or, suppose the situation were reversed and a
Massachusetts trust company were named as trustee in a pre-1939 will
of a Maryland domiciliary? Is the question one of "construction" to be
determined by the law of domicile, or is it one of "administration?" See:
Bank of New York v. Shillito, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 458 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co.,
1939), holding that the question is one of construction and applying the
law of the testator's domicile to the hypothetical question above stated.
Compare: Fell v. McReady, 236 App. Div. 390, 259 N.Y.S. 512, 522, aff'd.
263 N.Y. 602, 109 N.E. 718 (1933) ; Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N.H. 464, 200
A. 791 (1938); Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S.W. 2d 387 (1936);
LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICrTs OF LAWS, 14 (1940) 178-179. RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICTr OF LAWS (1934), §§ 297-299, inclusive, suggests that the question
may be one of administration to be decided, in some cases, by the law of
situs of the trust rather than of the state of the testator's domicile. Although the question does not seem to have been squarely raised in the
Maryland cases, the decisions in Smith v. Mercantile Trust Co., 199 Md.
264, 86 A. 2d 504 (1952), Staley v. 'Safe Deposit and Trust Company, 189
Md. 447, 56 A. 2d 144 (1947) and Prince de Bearn v. Winans, 111 Md.
434, 74 A. 626 (1909) suggest that the Shillito holding might meet with
favor in the Maryland courts.
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as to bring about the same result. He said in this connection:
"... it [the Massachusetts Rule] relieves the fiduciary
of many heavy responsibilities, such as ascertaining
the intact or original dollar value of the trust corpus;
or whether the dividend is declared from surplus
which was earned before or after, or partly before or
after the operative date of the instrument creating the
successive rights; and, if accumulated partly before
and after either the operative date of the instrument
or the termination, during the period of the operation
of the instrument, of a successive right of income,
what are the relative amounts of the income which
had accumulated before and after such points of division. The discharge of such duties would oblige the
fiduciary to obtain information from the corporation,
which he may act upon and so run the risk of its accuracy. If he should desire to go back of such information and assure himself of the true condition of the
corporation, he would require expert aid, and, the
greater the length of time included by his inquiry, the
more costly it would become, especially if the corporation is of foreign origin or location. Not every fiduciary would be competent nor possess the facilities to
fulfill these obligations, nor is every trust or fund
possessed of the financial resources to acquire the
necessary information. So a fiduciary would be frequently compelled to choose among expensive investigation, litigation, or the assumption of a risk which he
ought not to bear. These considerations argue for the
reasonableness of the construction of the statute here
maintained."'"
VI -

THE PROBLEM RESTATED

It is too late to construe the 1929 Act as the equivalent
of the Massachusetts Rule - as Judge Parke has recommended. And in the light of the Apponyi decision, it is
certainly too late to ask the court to abrogate the rule by
judicial decision, as was done in New Hampshire. 2 However, there are several ways in which the apportionment
174 Md. 639, dis. op. 684-685.
8Langdell v. Dodge, 100 N.H. 118, 122 A. 2d 529 (1956), overruling
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N.H. 201, 66 A. 124 (1907). See also: Bowles v.
Stilley's Executor, 267 S.W. 2d 707, 44 A.L.R. 2d 1273 (Ky. 1954) overruling the Kentucky Rule by judicial fiat.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

problem may be controlled, and perhaps even solved, in
the years that lie ahead:
(1) Now that the law is settled as to the "modern stock
split", a trustee may, in appropriate cases and with the
consent of the life tenants, have to consider whether the
application of the Pennsylvania Rule should be obviated
by selling a particular stock after an announcement of the
split but before the stock of record date arrives.8 The
proceeds of sale will, under Smith v. Hooper,4 be principal, and after the split has been effected, the trustee can,
if desired, buy back the same investment in the larger
number of shares resulting from the split, or, of course,
he can buy some other investment. This will usually entail a capital gains tax and some risk of market fluctations,
but the principal of the trust will, it is believed, be better
off to pay this tax and take the risk of an increase in the
price of the stock in the intervening period than to submit to the depleting effect of the Pennsylvania Rule.8 5
In many cases the trustee may be able to secure the
advance consent of the life tenants to such a sale and repurchase. Frequently, the life tenants do not, or should
not want the stock distributable to them under the
Donaldson rule since such receipts can cause serious
federal estate tax complications. It is believed that more
often than not such a sale and repurchase might be welcomed by the life tenants and that the resulting capital
gains tax would be a small price to pay for the saving to
be realized in federal estate taxes. If, however, the life
tenants object, such a sale and repurchase cannot be recommended."
" For a discussion of the date as of which the identity of the Income
beneficiary is to be determined see supra, n. 32. Obviously, any sale to
obviate the application of 'the Pennsylvania Rule would have to be made
before the record date to avoid receipt of the new stock by the trustee and
a corresponding change In the market value of the old stock.
95 Md. 16, 54 A. 95 (1902).
5See: Dunham, Trustee's Dilemma As To Principal-Income,98 Trusts &
Estates 9.32 (1959), and authorities therein cited. As the author observes, a
trustee's duty of impartiality is put to a severe test If he sells in anticipation of a stock distribution.
'6As
a result of the Apponyl decision, for example, an elderly life
tenant was given outright, as income, about $137,000 worth of stock which,
If kept in the corpus of the estate, would have passed tax-free at her
death. Although the record shows that this life tenant very much wanted
to receive this distribution, other life tenants who feel differently may
encounter gift tax problems if they refuse to accept their apportionments.
I"Such a sale and repurchase might be challenged on the authority of the
second Bowen case. [Bowen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 188 Md. 490, 53
A. 2d 416 (1957)], involving a sale by a trustee of defaulted blonds after a
plan of reorganization has been announced. There, the Court of Appeals
held that the proceeds of sale should be apportioned between Income and
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(2) Draftsmen of wills and deeds of trust should be
warned to refrain from writing clauses which will only
perpetuate the Pennsylvania Rule as to post-1939 estates.
It would seem that in general the best procedure to follow
is to omit all provisions dealing with principal and income,
and to let the statute take care of the matter. In some
cases, to be sure, the Pennsylvania Rule may bring the
result desired by the creator of the trust, and in others the
testator may want to leave the matter to the discretion of
the trustee. In every such case, however, the consequences
of such clauses should be thoroughly understood by the
draftsman and explained to the testator.
(3) The General Assembly should be urged to enact a
statute amending the Principal and Income Act to extend
its application to all corporate stock distributions made
after the effective date of the amendment, regardless of
the date of the creation of a particular trust estate. Although the courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have
regarded such legislation as "retroactive" and hence inapplicable to existing trusts," there is respectable authority to the contrary. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
has recently upheld the application of the Wisconsin Act
to all pre-existing estates, on the rationale that trust beneficiaries have no vested constitutional rights in future
earnings of companies in which the trust has invested
securities; and that although the income beneficiaries are
entitled to receive "income", this right does not carry with
it the right to freeze for all time the concept of what is
principal in the ratio that the accrued but unpaid interest bore to the
unpaid principal. The court emphasized that these bonds, unlike stocks,
carried fixed obligations as to both interest and principal, and that for
trust accounting purposes, therefore, It was only equitable that the proceeds of sale should be apportioned between the life tenants entitled to the
income and ithe remainderman entitled to the principal. Because of this
distinction, it is not believed that the second Bowen case would bar the
suggested sale and repurchase of stocks subject to modern stock splitsespecially since the Oourt of Appeals In the first Bowen case, (Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Bowen, 188 Md. 482, 487, 53 A. 2d 413 (1947))
reported only a few pages earlier In the same volume of the Maryland
Reports, reaffirmed its adherence to Smith v. Hooper and its rule that
"proceeds of sale or increase in the value of corporate stocks" are not
apportionable.
8In re Crawford's Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A. 2d 124 (1949) ; In re Pew's
Estate, 362 Pa. 468, 67 A. 2d 129 (1949) ; In re Steele's Estate, 377 Pa.
250, 103, A. 2d 459 (1954) ; In re Warden's Trust, 382 Pa. 458, 67 A. 2d 124
(955) ; In re Fera, 26 N.J. 131, 139 A. 2d 23 (1958) ; In re Wehrmane's
Estate, 41 N.J. Sup. 158, 124 A. 2d 334 (1956 Ch. Div.), aff'd. 23 N.J.
205, 128 A. 2d 681 (1957). Unlike the first Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act, the New Jersey Act did not purport to apply to existing trust
estates, and the comments in point which are made in the above cited cases
are dicta.
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income.8 9 After all, many trust concepts are subject to
change over the years, and some of them have a direct
bearing on the amount of income which the life tenants
receive- as, for example, the rate of the trustee's commissions which is not considered frozen at the percentages
in effect when the trust was created unless the trust instrument expressly so provides.
The commentators have been eloquent in urging statutory relief for the dilemma caused by the recent apportionment cases in Pennsylvania and New York. See, for
example, a recent comment concluding that "a retroactive
statute relating to stock dividends would be sustained in
most states- especially if the statute were restricted to
hybrid dividends . . .,"9Although the Maryland Court
of Appeals has been traditionally hostile to all forms of
''retroactive legislation" in the fields of testamentary and
trust law, a persuasive argument could be made that the
legislation here proposed is not "retroactive" at all in the
constitutional sense. Manifestly, the statutory solution is
the only truly effective method of controlling the apportionment chaos, and it seems to this writer well worth
the effort.
(4) And, finally, as new and different situations come
before the courts for interpretation and the application of
the Pennsylvania Rule, the nature of the problem should be
laid before the bench in terms which clearly explain it in
its historical perspective. In this regard, if this study has
clarified in some small measure some of the many inconsistencies of the Pennsylvania Rule as applied in this State
since 1894, it will have fulfilled its purpose.
'*In re Allis' Will, 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W. 2d 226 (1959), noted with
approval in 73 Harv. L. Rev. 605 (1960).
10Russell D. Niles, Fosdick, Cunningham & Chaos, 98 Trusts & Estates
924 (1959). And see also a recent casenote in 73 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 606,
suggesting that the validity of a retroactive application of such a statute
should turn on three factors: (1) the nature of the public interest in the
legislation, (2) the extent to which preenactment rights are affected and
(3) the nature of those rights.

